Autonomous system
AS11158 NETDEPON
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
NTT America (Virtela managed-network platform)
enterprise legacy
NETDEPON is registered to NTT America, Inc. at Bear Creek Pkwy, Redmond, Washington, but the network behind it is Virtela — the global managed-network-services company NTT acquired, whose Global Operations Center (goc@nttglobal.net) still appears on the ARIN record alongside NTT's own abuse, NOC and peering contacts.
What it's used for
Points of presence for an overlay network, not a backbone and not a hosting estate. RIS observes 30 announced IPv4 prefixes — almost every one a /24 — carrying about 7,680 addresses in total, no IPv6, and 30 observed BGP neighbours. Roughly one neighbour per prefix is the fingerprint of a distributed PoP footprint: a small block in each metro, announced locally and peered locally, terminating enterprise customers' managed VPN, SD-WAN and cloud-gateway services. Reverse DNS confirms the shape, with router names like ge-1-3-0.vfrpar1-nerd-2.virtela.net (a Paris PoP) under the operator's own virtela.net zone.
Notable
This AS is a useful counter-example to a superficially alarming pattern. Its /24s are scattered across three RIRs at once — ARIN (209.212.x, 64.254.x, 206.197.x), RIPE (77.247.x, 185.71.x, 212.11.x, 46.235.x) and APNIC (119.31.x, 117.103.x, 43.248.x) — which is the classic multi-RIR fragmentation that flags address leasing. The registrant column is what clears it: every resolvable prefix is registered to an NTT or Virtela handle (NTTA-209-212-224, VIRTELA_INFRASTRUCTURE, VIRTELA-SINGAPORE-SG-NET, SINGAPORE-SG-SDWAN-NET-1, US-EU-NTT-GLOBAL-20230425). Self-registered space with first-party rDNS means a real global operator whose inventory is scattered because its service is scattered.
Interesting
The handle names nobody recognisable and the registrant says NTT America, yet the actual operational identity is a company NTT bought. Reading only the ASN record would put this network in Redmond; reading the routing puts it in a few dozen cities on three continents.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 3 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Singapore Internet Exchange | Singapore, Singapore | 103.16.102.25 |
| Megaport IX Sydney | Sydney, Australia | 103.26.68.130 |
| MegaPort IX Singapore | Singapore, Singapore | 103.41.12.20 |
Transit providers
17 upstream, 4 downstream and 24 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-12, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 21 prefixes · 7.68K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 21 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS11158- Registry name
- NETDEPON
- Registrant
- NTT America, Inc.
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ntt.net
- Registered
- 1998-04-30
- Last changed
- 2023-12-19
- Allocation
- assigned
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 77% valid · 23 valid, 7 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 23 authorising AS11158
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 73% registered · 22 of 30 announcements 8 other origin
- Route objects
- 36 naming AS11158
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,769 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere