Autonomous system
AS10212 CHINAENTERCOM China Enterprise ICT Solutions Limited
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
China Enterprise ICT Solutions (China Entercom)
business enterprise mpls cloud
CHINAENTERCOM is the network of China Enterprise ICT Solutions Limited ("China Entercom" / CEC), a subsidiary of CITIC Telecom International Holdings that sells managed enterprise connectivity and cloud services inside mainland China.
What it's used for
- Nationwide enterprise VPN and MPLS private-network service for multinationals operating in China, plus the cloud data-centre and managed-security estate CEC runs in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
- The routing shape matches that business exactly. RIS sees 39 IPv4 prefixes covering 48,896 addresses and 2 IPv6 prefixes, anchored on mainland Chinese blocks (
218.97.0.0/17,218.96.64.0/22,210.5.0.0/19,183.91.144.0/20) with2403:b400::/32alongside. That is a purpose-built corporate carrier footprint, not a consumer access pool.
Notable
- Enterprise service provider, not an eyeball ISP. Only 10 observed BGP neighbours — far too few for a wholesale transit carrier, which would peer with hundreds to thousands of ASes, and the address count is far too small for a Chinese consumer broadband network. Roughly 48k addresses fronting a licensed value-added telecoms operator points squarely at corporate VPN endpoints, managed CPE and hosted workloads.
- The parent, CITIC Telecom, is the reason a Hong Kong-registered holder announces mainland space: CEC holds the mainland licences the group needs to sell in-country circuits and cloud, which foreign carriers cannot do directly.
Interesting
- The heavy nesting under
218.97.0.0/17(a /17, /18, /19, /20 and /21 all from the same base) is deliberate traffic engineering across multiple upstreams, a common pattern for a network whose customers buy SLA-backed private links.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
9 upstream, 1 downstream and 12 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9808 | China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd. | 709 |
| AS24400 | Shanghai Mobile Communications Co.,Ltd. | 474 |
| AS56048 | China Mobile Communicaitons Corporation | 459 |
| AS17621 | China Unicom Shanghai network | 176 |
| AS4847 | China Networks Inter-Exchange | 146 |
| AS17622 | China Unicom Guangzhou network | 124 |
| AS4808 | China Unicom Beijing Province Network | 75 |
| AS56040 | China Mobile communications corporation | 33 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 35 prefixes · 48.64K addresses IPv6 5 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 40 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10212- Registry name
- CHINAENTERCOM
- Abuse contact
- connie.wu@china-entercom.net
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2023-11-28
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 41 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 50 authorising AS10212
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 41 of 41 announcements
- Route objects
- 32 naming AS10212
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,772 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere