asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10212 CHINAENTERCOM China Enterprise ICT Solutions Limited

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 48.64K 35 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 5 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CN
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 9 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

China Enterprise ICT Solutions (China Entercom)

China · AI-generated

business enterprise mpls cloud

CHINAENTERCOM is the network of China Enterprise ICT Solutions Limited ("China Entercom" / CEC), a subsidiary of CITIC Telecom International Holdings that sells managed enterprise connectivity and cloud services inside mainland China.

What it's used for

  • Nationwide enterprise VPN and MPLS private-network service for multinationals operating in China, plus the cloud data-centre and managed-security estate CEC runs in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
  • The routing shape matches that business exactly. RIS sees 39 IPv4 prefixes covering 48,896 addresses and 2 IPv6 prefixes, anchored on mainland Chinese blocks (218.97.0.0/17, 218.96.64.0/22, 210.5.0.0/19, 183.91.144.0/20) with 2403:b400::/32 alongside. That is a purpose-built corporate carrier footprint, not a consumer access pool.

Notable

  • Enterprise service provider, not an eyeball ISP. Only 10 observed BGP neighbours — far too few for a wholesale transit carrier, which would peer with hundreds to thousands of ASes, and the address count is far too small for a Chinese consumer broadband network. Roughly 48k addresses fronting a licensed value-added telecoms operator points squarely at corporate VPN endpoints, managed CPE and hosted workloads.
  • The parent, CITIC Telecom, is the reason a Hong Kong-registered holder announces mainland space: CEC holds the mainland licences the group needs to sell in-country circuits and cloud, which foreign carriers cannot do directly.

Interesting

  • The heavy nesting under 218.97.0.0/17 (a /17, /18, /19, /20 and /21 all from the same base) is deliberate traffic engineering across multiple upstreams, a common pattern for a network whose customers buy SLA-backed private links.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

9 upstream, 1 downstream and 12 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS9808China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.709
AS24400Shanghai Mobile Communications Co.,Ltd.474
AS56048China Mobile Communicaitons Corporation459
AS17621China Unicom Shanghai network176
AS4847China Networks Inter-Exchange146
AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou network124
AS4808China Unicom Beijing Province Network75
AS56040China Mobile communications corporation33

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 35 prefixes · 48.64K addresses IPv6 5 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CNChina40

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS10212
Registry name
CHINAENTERCOM
Abuse contact
connie.wu@china-entercom.net
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2023-11-28
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 41 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
50 authorising AS10212
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 41 of 41 announcements
Route objects
32 naming AS10212

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,772 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check