Autonomous system
AS4808 CHINA169-BJ China Unicom Beijing Province Network
Residential APNIC
Summary
China Unicom Beijing (CHINA169)
isp legacy
Autonomous System 4808 (CHINA169-BJ) is China Unicom's Beijing provincial network, part of the CHINA169 backbone that China Unicom inherited from China Netcom in northern China.
What it's used for
- Fixed broadband and business access for the Beijing municipality, carried on China Unicom's 169 backbone.
Notable
- One of the largest single ASNs on the internet by announced IPv4 space — millions of addresses, overwhelmingly serving end users. A textbook eyeball network.
- Chinese carriers split their networks by province, so this AS is specifically the Beijing region, not China Unicom as a whole. It is state-owned, and its international traffic is subject to national filtering.
Interesting
- The "169" in the name is a legacy of China Netcom's network branding; the two companies merged into China Unicom in 2008, but the CHINA169 naming persists throughout its routing registry entries.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 926 prefixes · 7.18M addresses IPv6 223 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 1,149 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS4808- Registry name
- CHINA169-BJ
- Abuse contact
- hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2025-01-22
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- China Unicom Beijing Province Network
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Open
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 93% valid · 2,298 valid, 155 with no ROA 7 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 2,360 authorising AS4808
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 64% registered · 1,572 of 2,460 announcements 392 other origin
- Route objects
- 3,006 naming AS4808
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
28 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.
| Prefix | Advisory | Published |
|---|---|---|
111.203.153.245 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
111.203.153.95 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.246.237.111 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.246.92.58 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.246.92.71 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.246.93.103 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.246.94.102 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.246.94.154 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.255.70.18 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
114.255.70.20 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
Showing the first 10 of 28.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere