Autonomous system
AS4847 CNIX-AP China Networks Inter-Exchange
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
China Networks Inter-Exchange (CNIX)
transit legacy
Autonomous System 4847 (CNIX-AP) is China Networks Inter-Exchange, a Beijing-anchored Chinese interconnection and transit network. It is by far the largest network in this stretch of the AS range, originating several million IPv4 addresses across roughly a thousand prefixes.
What it's used for
- Carrying and originating address space on behalf of a long tail of Chinese networks: provincial ChinaNet blocks, independent broadband operators and data-centre companies all appear behind this AS.
- It takes transit from the major Chinese backbones and from international carriers, and sits upstream of a large number of smaller Chinese networks.
Notable
- A mixed-bag origin AS. Because it announces space registered to many different Chinese organisations, an address seen from AS4847 can be a data-centre server, a second-tier ISP's customer, or backbone infrastructure. Attribution is best done from the individual prefix, not from the AS.
- The APNIC record still carries its original description of an international link at Beijing connected to Sprint's global network, a snapshot of the era when China's outside connectivity ran through a small number of US carrier circuits.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 895 prefixes · 3.61M addresses IPv6 11 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 906 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS4847- Registry name
- CNIX-AP
- Abuse contact
- anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2021-06-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- CNIX-AP
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 82% valid · 732 valid, 108 with no ROA 52 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 795 authorising AS4847
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 92% registered · 817 of 892 announcements
- Route objects
- 1,083 naming AS4847
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
15 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.
| Prefix | Advisory | Published |
|---|---|---|
124.126.139.199 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
124.126.141.74 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
124.126.158.130 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
124.127.17.171 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
124.127.220.223 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
124.127.72.52 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
124.127.78.22 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
219.143.179.250 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
36.112.10.102 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
36.112.10.99 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
Showing the first 10 of 15.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere