Autonomous system
AS9808 CHINAMOBILE-CN China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.
Mobile APNIC
Summary
China Mobile
isp mobile eyeball
China Mobile (CHINAMOBILE-CN) — the world's largest mobile operator by subscribers, and increasingly a fixed-broadband provider in China too.
What it's used for
- Mobile and (growing) fixed broadband for a subscriber base numbering in the hundreds of millions — a huge "eyeball" network.
Notable
- State-owned; consumer traffic is subject to China's national filtering.
- One of several China Mobile ASNs; the group's total footprint spans many more prefixes than this one ASN.
Interesting
- China Mobile entered fixed broadband relatively late but grew fast enough to rival the incumbent fixed carriers within a few years.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 7,828 prefixes · 17.46M addresses IPv6 7,462 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 15,290 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9808- Registry name
- CHINAMOBILE-CN
- Registrant
- China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd
- Abuse contact
- abuse@chinamobile.com
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2026-08-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 98% valid · 21,017 valid, 391 with no ROA 6 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 21,157 authorising AS9808
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 99.6% registered · 21,324 of 21,414 announcements 48 other origin
- Route objects
- 22,693 naming AS9808
Reputation
Classification and threat
Mobile Cellular carrier. Addresses are shared by many handsets via CGNAT.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
42 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.
| Prefix | Advisory | Published |
|---|---|---|
111.55.137.40 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
111.55.138.141 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.143.161 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.145.154 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.168.102 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.168.104 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.168.138 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.168.151 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.168.160 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.5.168.187 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
Showing the first 10 of 42.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere