Autonomous system
AS9811 DRCSCNET Development & Research Center of State Council Net.
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Development Research Center of the State Council (DRCSCNET)
legacy government hosting
AS9811 (DRCSCNET) is registered to the network of the Development Research Center of the State Council, the Chinese central government's policy-research and consulting institution in Beijing. The registrant is unambiguous, but the network it runs is much larger than a think tank needs, and the routing evidence points at data-centre use.
What it's used for
RIS sees 40 IPv4 prefixes carrying 124,160 addresses and no IPv6, announced through only 2 BGP neighbours (China Unicom's Beijing network and the China Networks Inter-Exchange). Two upstreams and no peering means this is purely a consumer of transit. But 124,000 addresses is two orders of magnitude more than an office would use, and the inventory is drawn from four unrelated CNNIC ranges — a 121.47.0.0/16, blocks in 211.144, 211.167, 218.246, 220.101 and 202.149, plus a late APNIC 103.29.136.0/22. Public BGP directories describe many of these prefixes as IDC host-node blocks. The honest reading is that the AS is the registered home of a government-affiliated address holding whose space is largely put to commercial hosting, rather than a network carrying the research centre's own staff traffic.
Notable
- Name and use diverge here. The holder is a state policy body; the announced inventory looks like data-centre address space. Treat geolocation of individual addresses in this AS with care.
- Nearly all prefixes are RPKI-signed and valid, which is better hygiene than most networks of this vintage.
- Despite the size of the IPv4 holding, no IPv6 is announced.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 38 prefixes · 124K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 38 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9811- Registry name
- DRCSCNET
- Abuse contact
- jin.huang@srit.com.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2021-10-26
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 38 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 40 authorising AS9811
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 8% registered · 3 of 38 announcements
- Route objects
- 12 naming AS9811
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere