Autonomous system
AS9805 ENS-PEK SIEMENS LTD. CHINA
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Siemens Ltd. China
legacy enterprise
AS9805 (ENS-PEK) is held by Siemens Ltd. China, the Chinese arm of the German industrial conglomerate. The handle reads as Siemens' Enterprise Network Services at Peking/Beijing, and the routing evidence backs that up: this is a corporate network, not a service provider.
What it's used for
RIS sees exactly 2 IPv4 prefixes and 512 addresses, announced through 2 BGP neighbours, with no IPv6. Both prefixes — 194.138.202.0/24 and 194.138.245.0/24 — come out of 194.138.0.0/16, the RIPE block Siemens has long used for its worldwide corporate network; the two /24s carved out and announced from Beijing are the Chinese entity's slice of it. Sampled reverse DNS resolves straight into Siemens' own Chinese domain (www.sit.siemens.com.cn, odpoc.siemens.com.cn), so the space is carrying Siemens-branded application and web endpoints rather than customer traffic. Two /24s and a pair of upstreams is the classic multihomed enterprise DMZ pattern: enough address space to publish public-facing corporate services and enough redundancy to keep them reachable, with no ambition to move anyone else's packets.
Notable
- The AS number is low because Siemens' network registrations date from the early commercial internet, but this specific AS is the China entity, not the group backbone.
- Address space is RIPE-registered (
194.138/16) even though the network is announced from China — a reminder that RIR of record does not follow geography for multinationals. - No IPv6 is announced.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9805- Registry name
- ENS-PEK
- Abuse contact
- ipas@cnnic.cn
- Registered
- 2019-12-10
- Last changed
- 2021-06-16
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9805
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 2 naming AS9805
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere