Autonomous system
AS9640 KRCERT-AS-KR Korea Internet Security Agency
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
KrCERT/CC — Korea Internet & Security Agency
government research legacy
AS9640 (KRCERT-AS-KR) is held by the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA), and the handle names its purpose: KrCERT/CC, the Korea Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center, South Korea's national CERT for the private sector. KISA sits under the Ministry of Science and ICT and also runs KRNIC, the registry for .kr and for Korea's IP address space.
What it's used for
The AS announces 6 IPv4 prefixes, 1,536 addresses, no IPv6, and has 2 observed BGP neighbours. Six /24s behind two upstreams is an end-site network: no customer cone, no transit role, nothing carrying third-party traffic. The neighbour count is the decisive signal — a network this size with hundreds of peers would be a carrier or a broker; with two, it buys connectivity and originates only its own space.
The composition of the six prefixes is the interesting part. Three of them — 192.5.90.0/24, 192.132.247.0/24 and 192.203.140.0/24 — sit in the old 192/8 class-C "swamp", space handed out in the earliest era of the registry system and rarely found outside organisations that are part of the internet's institutional furniture. The other three (218.37.128.0/24, 218.37.129.0/24, 180.222.220.0/24) are ordinary Korean assignments — the mix a body inherits when it holds pieces of the country's original registry infrastructure alongside later operational networks.
Notable
- KISA holds two low-numbered ASes here: AS9640 and AS9642, under different handles. KISA is the product of a 2009 merger of three predecessor agencies, which likely explains more than one network record under one roof.
- The legacy class-C blocks show how far back this organisation's involvement in the network runs.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-24, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 5 prefixes · 2.05K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9640- Registry name
- KRCERT-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-08-18
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 8 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9640
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 50% registered · 4 of 8 announcements 4 other origin
- Route objects
- 9 naming AS9640
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-25. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere