Autonomous system
AS9457 DREAMX-AS DREAMLINE CO.
Hosting APNIC
Summary
Dreamline
isp enterprise hosting transit legacy
AS9457 (DREAMX-AS) is held by Dreamline Co., Ltd. (드림라인), a South Korean telecom operator founded in 1997 that builds and runs its own nationwide fibre backbone. Its business today is business-to-business: leased lines, dedicated internet access, data-centre (IDC) services, business messaging and tower/utility network services. Despite the address footprint, it is not a consumer broadband ISP.
What it's used for
RIS observes 110 IPv4 prefixes covering roughly 900,000 addresses, one IPv6 prefix (2001:c48::/32), and 57 BGP neighbours. The IPv4 space is dominated by whole classful-era /16s — 121.53.0.0/16, 220.230.0.0/16, 61.107.0.0/16, 211.249.0.0/16 and more — the kind of large blocks a network only gets by having been an eyeball provider early.
That is exactly the history: Dreamline built a national network in 1998 and sold consumer high-speed internet in the Seoul region, but handed the entire consumer broadband business to Hanaro Telecom in 2003 when SeAH Group took over the company. The /16s stayed. The customers did not. What the space carries now is enterprise dedicated-line customers, IDC/colocation tenants, and wholesale connectivity — its named customer base runs to mobile carriers, other ISPs, financial institutions and IT companies, and it is an AWS Direct Connect partner.
Fifty-seven neighbours on ~900k addresses is the middle ground the evidence points to: too many peers for a pure end-site, far too few for a tier-1 transit carrier. It is a mid-sized national carrier reselling connectivity and hosting.
Notable
- PeeringDB still lists this network as "Cable/DSL/ISP" with 100–200 Gbps of balanced traffic. That label is more than two decades stale — the retail broadband business was divested in 2003 — and is a good example of a directory entry describing a company's past rather than its inventory.
- Ownership has changed repeatedly: a Korea Expressway Corporation / CJ joint venture at founding, then Hanaro Telecom, then SeAH Group, then the private-equity firm EQ Partners in December 2014.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 3 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| BroadBand Internet eXchange Tokyo | Tokyo, Japan | 101.203.90.155 |
| Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINX | Seoul, South Korea | 139.150.100.24 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Seoul | Seoul, South Korea | 103.140.210.7 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 414 prefixes · 783K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 415 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9457- Registry name
- DREAMX-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1998-11-30
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 25% valid · 28 valid, 85 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 37 authorising AS9457
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 90% registered · 103 of 114 announcements 3 other origin
- Route objects
- 194 naming AS9457
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere