asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9308 CHINA-ABITCOOL AbitcoolChina Inc.

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 305K 82 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CN
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 4 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Abitcool (China)

China · AI-generated

isp hosting business legacy

AS9308 (CHINA-ABITCOOL) is held by Abitcool(China) Inc., a network operator registered in Beijing. RIS sees 81 IPv4 prefixes carrying 406,272 addresses, no IPv6, and only 4 observed BGP neighbours.

What it's used for

The proportions are the whole story: four hundred thousand addresses behind four neighbours. That rules out any transit or wholesale role — a carrier moving this much space would peer with hundreds of ASes — and describes instead a network that buys upstream from a small number of Chinese backbones and originates a large block of its own. Registry records show those upstreams to be the expected set (China Telecom, China Unicom and related backbones), plus a second Abitcool-held ASN, AS9802.

The announcements are large and aggregated — full /16s at 124.250.0.0, 120.134.0.0, 124.251.0.0, 182.174.0.0 and 182.175.0.0, then the same space re-announced as more specific /17s and /19s, a common Chinese traffic-engineering pattern rather than a sign of fragmentation. The interesting detail is who sits inside that space: registry sub-assignments name third-party operators, including the data-centre provider 21Vianet, so a substantial part of this network's inventory is hosting and IDC customer space rather than the operator's own eyeballs.

Notable

  • Marketing describes a broadband operator, but the delegations inside the space read like a wholesale/IDC landlord. Treat the hosting component as real.
  • Abitcool operates at least two ASNs; AS9308 is the larger of the pair by address count.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

4 upstream, 0 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4847China Networks Inter-Exchange1,405
AS141679China Telecom Beijing Tianjin Hebei Big Data Industry Park Branch793
AS23724IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation625
AS9808China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.27

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-31, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 82 prefixes · 305K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CNChina82

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS9308
Registry name
CHINA-ABITCOOL
Abuse contact
hwming@gdvnet.com
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2023-11-28
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Abitcool(China)
Scope
Not Disclosed
Traffic ratio
Not Disclosed

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
99% valid · 95 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
30 authorising AS9308
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
64% registered · 61 of 96 announcements 35 other origin
Route objects
610 naming AS9308

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,845 prefixes, as published 2026-10-31. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check