Autonomous system
AS8309 SIPARTECH
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Sipartech
transit isp legacy
SIPARTECH is Sipartech SAS, a Paris-based independent fibre operator. It builds and lights its own optical network across France and western Europe, selling dark fibre, wavelengths, Ethernet and IP transit to carriers, datacentres and enterprises.
What it's used for
- IP transit and carrier backbone. The AS peers widely (roughly 190 observed BGP neighbours) and carries downstream networks, which is the shape of a transit provider rather than an end-user network.
- The IPv4 footprint is small in address count but structurally significant: a handful of large aggregates such as
62.129.0.0/19,217.180.128.0/18and37.19.128.0/18, most of which get carved into customer assignments. - Sipartech's core business is the physical layer. The company's own description emphasises dark fibre and optical transmission linking major datacentres and business districts, with IP transit sold on top of that infrastructure.
Notable
- This is infrastructure, not eyeballs. There are no subscriber pools anywhere in the space. What reverse DNS exists is either Sipartech's own operational naming (
ns-2.sipartech.com, hosts undertransmission-fibre.fr) or a customer's own domain sitting inside a Sipartech block. An IP here should be read as "a network buying transit or fibre from Sipartech", not as a Sipartech end user. - Some prefixes announced by the AS are registered to other organisations entirely, which is normal for a transit carrier announcing customer space.
Interesting
- Sipartech is one of the few French operators that owns the fibre it sells rather than reselling someone else's, which is why its addressing is modest while its peering and customer cone are not. Address count is a poor proxy for the importance of a network like this.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 17 exchanges in 5 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.195.6 |
| LINX LON1 | London, United Kingdom | 195.66.226.125 |
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.211.152 |
| Neutral Internet Exchange | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 193.239.119.214 |
| France-IX Paris | Paris, France | 37.49.237.47 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Ashburn | Ashburn, United States | 206.126.237.197 |
| Seattle Internet Exchange | Seattle, United States | 206.81.81.86 |
| Coresite - Any2 West | Los Angeles, United States | 206.72.210.101 |
Transit providers
41 upstream, 18 downstream and 88 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 8 prefixes · 68.86K addresses IPv6 5 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| FR | France | 13 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8309- Registry name
- SIPARTECH
- Registrant
- SIPARTECH SAS
- Abuse contact
- ripe@sipartech.com
- Registered
- 2009-04-14
- Last changed
- 2023-10-24
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 15 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 17 authorising AS8309
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 15 of 15 announcements
- Route objects
- 18 naming AS8309
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere