Autonomous system
AS49666 TIC-GW-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Telecommunication Infrastructure Company
transit government infrastructure iran
TIC-GW-AS is operated by Telecommunication Infrastructure Company.
What it's used for
- The address space carries infrastructure and enterprise traffic, evidenced by netnames such as
IR-DCC-20101018,AT-NET,RESPINA, andAVABARIDregistered to Iran Information Technology Company PJSC and other entities. - The AS announces 56,576 IPv4 addresses across 64 prefixes and maintains 146 observed neighbours, a ratio indicating a transit or backbone role rather than a direct access network.
- As the state-owned entity responsible for Iran's telecommunication network infrastructure, this AS carries national backbone traffic, interconnecting various Iranian ISPs and government entities.
Notable
- Registrants include Iran Information Technology Company PJSC for the majority of large blocks, while the AS holder is Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, reflecting the separation between infrastructure ownership and specific service provision or historical allocation.
- The inventory consists of a mix of large /19 and /20 blocks alongside numerous smaller /23 prefixes, indicating a finely subdivided internal corporate estate or managed infrastructure space.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.192.72 |
| Neutral Internet Exchange | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 193.239.116.61 |
| DE-CIX Istanbul | Istanbul, Turkey | 185.1.48.13 |
Transit providers
10 upstream, 16 downstream and 66 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 64 prefixes · 50.69K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IR | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 66 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS49666- Registry name
- TIC-GW-AS
- Registrant
- Telecommunication Infrastructure Company
- Abuse contact
- l_meybodi@tic.ir
- Registered
- 2017-09-08
- Last changed
- 2026-10-07
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- TIC AS49666
- Also known as
- TIC
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-TICGW- Present at
- 3 exchanges
- Website
- http://tic.ir
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 96% valid · 26 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 82 authorising AS49666
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 41% registered · 11 of 27 announcements 9 other origin
- Route objects
- 21 naming AS49666
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere