Autonomous system
AS43050 CHOKOLOVKA-AS ChokolovkaNet
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
ChokolovkaNet
isp residential ukraine
The AS handle CHOKOLOVKA-AS is held by ChokolovkaNet, operated by Ivankov Daniil Eliseevich.
What it's used for
- The address space carries residential and small business internet access in Ukraine, as indicated by the netnames
CHOKOLOVKA-NETandChokolovkaNetassociated with the registrant Chokolovka NOC. - The network announces 3584 IPv4 addresses across 3 prefixes, with 3 observed routing neighbours, a ratio consistent with a local access provider rather than a transit carrier.
- Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber eyeballs and local internet users in the Chokolovka region of Ukraine.
Notable
- All three announced prefixes share the same registrant, Chokolovka NOC, and netnames align with the AS handle, indicating a single, consistent operator.
- The address inventory is compact, comprising one /21, one /22, and one /23, all located in Ukraine.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| RUDAKI-IX | Kiev, Ukraine | 185.1.225.41 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 3.84K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UA | Ukraine | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS43050- Registry name
- CHOKOLOVKA-AS
- Registrant
- CHOKOLOVKA-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@chokolovka.net
- Registered
- 2007-05-30
- Last changed
- 2026-10-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- CHOKOLOVKA-AS
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 4 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS43050
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS43050
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere