Autonomous system
AS29067 UATLD-AS LLC "Hostmaster"
Hosting RIPE
Summary
Hostmaster
cc-tld dns business ukraine
UATLD-AS is operated by LLC "Hostmaster", the technical operator for the Ukrainian ccTLD.
What it's used for
- The address space supports the infrastructure of the .ua domain, evidenced by netnames such as
HMDNS-NETandUACCTLD-NET. - The AS announces 1792 IPv4 addresses across 5 prefixes and 8 IPv6 prefixes, with 21 observed neighbours, indicating a specialized infrastructure role rather than mass residential access.
Notable
- All registrants for the announced prefixes are LLC "Hostmaster", consistent with the AS holder.
- The inventory consists of five distinct IPv4 blocks, including 109.70.108.0/23 and 185.159.140.0/23, alongside a set of /48 IPv6 prefixes.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Giganet Internet Exchange | Kyiv, Ukraine | 185.1.62.208 |
Transit providers
13 upstream, 2 downstream and 26 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-04, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 5 prefixes · 1.79K addresses IPv6 8 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UA | Ukraine | 13 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS29067- Registry name
- UATLD-AS
- Registrant
- LLC "Hostmaster"
- Abuse contact
- abuse@hostmaster.ua
- Registered
- 2003-05-23
- Last changed
- 2026-01-12
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Hostmaster
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 15 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 18 authorising AS29067
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 15 of 15 announcements
- Route objects
- 21 naming AS29067
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 452 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-05. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere