asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS197119 ASKRENA KRENA - Kyrgyz research and education network association

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 2.05K 4 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KG
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

KRENA

Kyrgyzstan · AI-generated

education research nren kyrgyzstan

ASKRENA is operated by KRENA, the Kyrgyz research and education network association.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries the national research and education network, with all four announced prefixes registered under the netname KRENA-NET.
  • The AS announces 2048 IPv4 addresses across 4 prefixes and maintains 2 observed neighbours, a ratio consistent with a national NREN providing connectivity to academic and research institutions rather than a large-scale commercial access provider.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of researchers, students, and staff at Kyrgyz universities and research institutes, supporting activities such as climate monitoring and academic collaboration.

Notable

  • All registrants in the RDAP data agree with the announcer, listing KRENA - Kyrgyz research and education network association for every prefix.
  • KRENA is a member of the CAREN (Central Asian Research and Education Network) and provides Eduroam services in Kyrgyzstan.
  • The inventory consists of four contiguous IPv4 prefixes within the 178.217.168.0/22 range, with no IPv6 prefixes currently announced.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8449"ElCat" Ltd.61
AS12764AKNET Ltd.6

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-06, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 4 prefixes · 2.05K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KGKyrgyzstan4

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS197119
Registry name
ASKRENA
Registrant
KRENA-MNT
Abuse contact
zak@krena.kg
Registered
2010-06-15
Last changed
2019-12-13
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
50% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
1 authorising AS197119
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
3 naming AS197119

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,854 prefixes, as published 2026-11-06. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check