asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12764 AKNET-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 13.31K 6 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KG
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 11 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

AKNET

Kyrgyzstan · AI-generated

isp business

A Kyrgyz provider whose oldest block was registered on the same day as an Austrian one.

What it's used for

  • An internet provider in Kyrgyzstan. 13,312 addresses across six IPv4 prefixes, 13 observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • The largest block is 212.112.96.0/19, netname KG-AKNET-19991027.
  • Later dated netnames run KG-AKNET-20110323 and KG-AKNET-20130628; three blocks in 213.109 carry the undated netname KG-AKNET.
  • Reverse names are the address in dashes: 212.112.111.255 answers as 212-112-111-255.aknet.kg.
  • Twelve of eighteen sampled addresses returned a name.

Interesting

  • 19991027 is the same date as the netname on an Austrian network elsewhere in this range. Two unrelated holders on opposite sides of the continent share an exact registration day because the registry processed a batch of applications together, and every record created that day carries the stamp. The date is the registry's calendar, not the network's.
  • 13 neighbours for 13,312 addresses is a lot of interconnection for the size. A provider in a landlocked country with no coastline and no cable landing has to reach the internet through its neighbours' networks, and the way to make that survivable is to buy from several of them.
  • Three separate allocation eras sit in one inventory: a 1999 /19 from the old European ranges, a 2011 /21 and a 2013 /22 from the exhaustion-era blocks, and undated space in 213.109. The dates trace how hard addresses became to get.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 11 downstream and 12 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8449"ElCat" Ltd.4,030

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 6 prefixes · 13.31K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KGKyrgyzstan6

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12764
Registry name
AKNET-AS
Registrant
AS12764-MNT
Abuse contact
ripe@aknet.kg
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2017-11-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 62 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS12764
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 62 of 62 announcements
Route objects
68 naming AS12764

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check