asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8449 AS8449-ELCAT

Unclassified RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP

IPv4 addresses 12.54K 17 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KG
Exchanges 2 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 5 42 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

ElCat

Kyrgyzstan · AI-generated

isp transit business legacy

ElCat Ltd. (AS8449-ELCAT) — a Kyrgyz telecom operator based in Bishkek, operating since 1994 and one of the country's oldest and largest internet providers, with its own fibre backbone.

What it's used for

  • IP transit, dedicated channels and IP VPN for corporate customers, government organisations and other Kyrgyz operators, including the country's cellular carriers.
  • The address space reflects that: static assignments under NAME.static.elcat.kg, named customer hosts (global-tours.elcat.kg, netsolution.elcat.kg), voice gear (gkbox1.voip.kg) and access gateways. Generic sequential names of the form IP-ADDR-IP-ADDR.elcat.kg cover the rest.

Notable

  • Despite being a household ISP name in Kyrgyzstan, the inventory and the company's own description are business-first: corporate connectivity, operator transit and cross-border capacity, not mass-market broadband pools. There are no dial-up, DSL or dynamic-subscriber naming conventions anywhere in the sampled rDNS.
  • Well peered for its size — roughly 16,000 IPv4 addresses but dozens of BGP neighbours, which is what an operator-of-operators looks like.

Interesting

  • ElCat built the first cross-border fibre link from Kyrgyzstan into Kazakhstan (Bishkek to Kordai) in 2009. In a landlocked, mountainous country, whoever owns the border crossings owns the internet economics.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 2 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
MSK-IX MoscowMoscow, Russia195.208.210.194
KG-IXBishkek, Kyrgyzstan185.1.110.9

Transit providers

5 upstream, 42 downstream and 62 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS28910"Uzbektelekom" Joint Stock Company2,556
AS35168TNS-Plus LLP411
AS24482SG.GS50
AS49673Truenetwork LLC49
AS9002RETN Limited25

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 17 prefixes · 12.54K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KGKyrgyzstan18

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8449
Registry name
AS8449-ELCAT
Registrant
ELCAT-RIPE-MNT
Abuse contact
netgroup@elcat.kg
Registered
2001-11-29
Last changed
2026-07-06
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
ElCat AS8449
Also known as
ElCat
Network type
Cable/DSL/ISP
Scope
Not Disclosed
Traffic ratio
Heavy Inbound
Peering policy
Open
IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-ELCAT RIPE::AS-ELCAT-V6
Present at
3 exchanges
Website
http://www.elcat.kg

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 51 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
8 authorising AS8449
ASPA
3 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 51 of 51 announcements
Route objects
63 naming AS8449

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check