asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16552 DIGICERT

Hosting ARIN Content

IPv4 addresses 20.99K 35 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 202 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly US
Exchanges 32 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 61 3 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Tiggee

United States of America · AI-generated

infrastructure hosting business

Five brands share one network: the handle, the holder, two reverse-DNS domains, and a fifth on three blocks.

What it's used for

  • An anycast DNS network. Thirty-three IPv4 prefixes and two hundred and three IPv6 prefixes announced from the United States, twenty-one thousand two hundred and forty-eight addresses, through two hundred and forty-one observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The AS handle is a certificate authority's brand. The holder is a differently named company, and the two share no other field.
  • Most netnames are the holder's brand, sometimes with a country code, a city code and a numeral one, sometimes with a two-letter region marking which registry issued the block.
  • One puts the country first, runs the company name and a numeral together, and stamps the issue date on the end.
  • Three blocks belong to a fifth company entirely, all under one netname of three letters and a four-digit number.
  • Two list an incident response team as a registrant object, beside the company written twice in different capitalisation.
  • Seventeen of eighteen queried addresses answered across four domains: two consumer DNS brands, the holder's systems domain, and one name-server name.

Interesting

  • Two hundred and forty-one neighbours on twenty-one thousand addresses is the signature of anycast: the same addresses announced from many places at once, so the count stays small.
  • Two redirection domains under different brands in one record is acquisition residue. Each brand kept its zone; the addresses were pooled underneath.
  • A date in a netname records when the block was issued: the one fact here nobody can revise.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 32 exchanges in 17 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
IX.br (PTT.br) São PauloSão Paulo, Brazil187.16.219.29
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.193.47
LINX LON1London, United Kingdom195.66.224.157
AMS-IX AmsterdamAmsterdam, Netherlands80.249.214.44
NAPAfrica IX JohannesburgJohannesburg, South Africa196.60.10.62
France-IX ParisParis, France37.49.236.9
Equinix Internet Exchange SingaporeSingapore, Singapore27.111.229.252
Equinix Internet Exchange AshburnAshburn, United States206.126.238.92

Transit providers

61 upstream, 3 downstream and 100 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB2,236
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC1,164
AS2914NTT America, Inc.1,160
AS3257GTT Communications Inc.895
AS4637Telstra Global312
AS9498BHARTI Airtel Ltd.265
AS7195EDGEUNO S.A.S202
AS9002RETN Limited172

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 35 prefixes · 20.99K addresses IPv6 202 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
USUnited States of America237

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS16552
Registry name
DIGICERT
Registrant
Tiggee LLC
Abuse contact
dns-abuse@digicert.com
Registered
2007-07-18
Last changed
2025-03-02
Allocation
assigned

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
DigiCert DNS
Also known as
DNS Made Easy / Constellix / DigiCert DNS
Network type
Content
Scope
Global
Traffic ratio
Balanced
Peering policy
Open
IRR as-set
AS16552:AS-CONE
Present at
34 exchanges
Facilities
28 facilities
Website
https://www.digicert.com/dns-trust-manager

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 182 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
84 authorising AS16552
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 182 of 182 announcements
Route objects
373 naming AS16552

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check