Autonomous system
AS16019 VODAFONE-CZ-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Vodafone Czech Republic
telecom isp mobile
Over a million addresses, and every single block still named after the mobile brand that was bought.
What it's used for
- A national mobile and fixed operator. Forty-six IPv4 prefixes and thirteen IPv6 prefixes announced from Czechia, one million two hundred and ten thousand three hundred and sixty-eight addresses, across one hundred and fifteen observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Every netname is the country code, the absorbed mobile brand, and a date. Not one block carries the current brand.
- The second registrant on all of them is that same old brand followed by three letters for a local internet registry, so the registry membership itself is still filed under it.
- The dates run across seven years, and the largest blocks are the oldest: the operator was handed very large allocations early and kept adding.
- All eighteen queried addresses answered. Most are two letters, the four octets hyphenated, and a subdomain for the backbone; one is marked as fixed instead, and one sits on a different subdomain of the same domain.
- Customer addresses use a separate form entirely: a contraction for customer, sometimes with a city code, and only the last two numbers of the address.
Interesting
- Reverse names built from only half the address work because the other half is implied by the zone. It saves nothing operationally and quietly makes the names ambiguous when read out of context.
- Thirteen separate IPv6 prefixes rather than one is the mark of a group that has absorbed several registry memberships and never consolidated them.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| NIX.CZ - Neutral Internet eXchange for the Czech Republic | Prague, Czech Republic | 91.210.16.95 |
Transit providers
10 upstream, 91 downstream and 165 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 46 prefixes · 1.21M addresses IPv6 13 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CZ | Czechia | 59 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16019- Registry name
- VODAFONE-CZ-AS
- Registrant
- Vodafone Czech Republic a.s.
- Abuse contact
- abuse@vodafone.cz
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2025-12-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Vodafone Czech Republic
- Also known as
- Vodafone CZ
- Scope
- Europe
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
AS-VODAFONE-CZ- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 1 facilities
- Website
- https://www.vodafone.cz
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 107 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 112 authorising AS16019
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 107 of 107 announcements
- Route objects
- 108 naming AS16019
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere