asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15965 AS15965 CEGECOM S.A.

Residential RIPE

IPv4 addresses 22.02K 8 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly LU
Exchanges 4 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 25 13 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

CEGECOM

Luxembourg · AI-generated

telecom isp transit

Six reverse names pad every octet to three digits; the seventh is the same idea in capitals with dots.

What it's used for

  • A carrier's network. Eight IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 /32 announced from Luxembourg, twenty-two thousand and sixteen addresses, across one hundred and thirty-three observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Seven of eighteen queried addresses answered. Six begin with two letters and a hyphen, then the four octets in reverse order, each padded with leading zeros to three digits.
  • The seventh uses the same two letters but separates with dots, keeps the octets in their normal order, drops the padding, and writes the entire name including the domain in capitals.
  • Five netnames follow a country code, the brand and a date, with the two oldest falling in the middle and late nineteen-nineties.
  • One block belongs to a different company under a netname joining a technology contraction and the country code; another is named with a run-together phrase about connectivity for a secondary operator.
  • One block's registry lookup failed, so its details are unknown rather than absent.

Interesting

  • Zero-padding makes reverse names sort correctly as text, which matters when the names end up in log files that get sorted rather than parsed. It also makes them fixed width, so a column of them lines up.
  • The capitalised outlier is what happens when one zone is maintained by hand alongside six that are generated. DNS ignores case, so nothing breaks and nobody notices for years.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 4 exchanges in 4 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.193.14
France-IX ParisParis, France37.49.236.148
Luxembourg Internet ExchangeLuxembourg, Luxembourg188.93.170.5
Belgian National Internet ExchangeBrussels, Belgium194.53.172.54

Transit providers

25 upstream, 13 downstream and 59 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC114
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB91
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC68
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC57
AS34549meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG33
AS12859BIT BV9
AS24482SG.GS9
AS45049Mohamed El Bouddunti9

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 8 prefixes · 22.02K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
LULuxembourg9

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15965
Registry name
AS15965
Registrant
CEGECOM-LU-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@cegecom.lu
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2026-05-29
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
89% valid · 8 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
8 authorising AS15965
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
Route objects
11 naming AS15965

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check