Autonomous system
AS15802 DU-AS1
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Emirates Integrated Telecommunications
isp telecom mobile business
Over a million addresses, eleven hundred neighbours, and not one reverse name.
What it's used for
- A national operator's network. A hundred and ten IPv4 prefixes and twenty-four IPv6 prefixes announced from the United Arab Emirates, one million one hundred and fifty-three thousand addresses, across one thousand one hundred and thirty-one observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name, on a consumer network with more than a million addresses.
- The IPv6 announcements double at every step, running from two prefixes of one length through eight successively shorter ones, so ten routes cover ground that two would.
- Every netname follows one pattern: a country code, the two-letter consumer brand, and a date. The dates span more than a decade of allocations.
- Every registrant is the legal entity behind that brand, whose name shares no words with it.
- Two blocks' registry lookups failed, so their details are unknown rather than absent.
- The routing archive has carried this number since the earliest data it holds.
Interesting
- Eleven hundred neighbours puts this among the most densely interconnected networks in this range, which is what a national operator in a regional transit hub looks like.
- Silence across the whole reverse-DNS sample is unusual at this size. Most consumer networks generate a name for every address whether or not anybody wants one; this one publishes nothing, so an address here resolves to no story at all.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 7 exchanges in 7 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.194.198 |
| LINX LON1 | London, United Kingdom | 195.66.225.104 |
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.210.125 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Singapore | Singapore, Singapore | 27.111.228.92 |
| DE-CIX Marseille | Marseille, France | 185.1.47.98 |
| UAE-IX | Dubai, United Arab Emirates | 185.1.8.1 |
| AMS-IX Djibouti | Djibouti City, Djibouti | 196.223.38.210 |
Transit providers
51 upstream, 54 downstream and 151 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 53 prefixes · 1.15M addresses IPv6 24 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| AE | United Arab Emirates | 77 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15802- Registry name
- DU-AS1
- Registrant
- DIC-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@du.ae
- Registered
- 2001-10-22
- Last changed
- 2026-09-25
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 98% valid · 353 valid, 6 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 330 authorising AS15802
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 359 of 359 announcements
- Route objects
- 1,170 naming AS15802
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere