asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15614 DRAGON Dragon Internet a.s.

Residential ARIN

IPv4 addresses 19.97K 6 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CZ
Exchanges 2 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 9 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Dragon Internet

Czechia · AI-generated

isp telecom hosting business

Two of the five answering addresses sit on other companies' domains.

What it's used for

  • A regional provider. Six IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 /29 announced from Czechia, nineteen thousand addresses, across thirty-one observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Two answering addresses are named under two other companies' domains, so parts of this space are run by, or resold to, businesses trading under their own brands.
  • Three answering addresses use the provider's own domain, two of them marked as address translation pools with the last two octets in the name.
  • One of those octet pairs writes a zero as three digits, padded to the same width as any other value.
  • Five netnames are the country code, the company and an allocation date; the sixth has the company but no date, and it belongs to the oldest block.
  • Every block lists three registrants built by appending role codes to the company name.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and five returned a name.

Interesting

  • Other brands in the reverse names are the clearest sign of wholesale. The customers are visible because they wanted to be, having put their own names on their own addresses.
  • Naming address translation pools tells anyone reading logs that traffic from those addresses is shared between many subscribers, which is genuinely useful and rarely published.
  • A netname without a date is almost always the first one. It was created before the convention existed and never brought into line.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Peering.czPrague, Czech Republic185.0.20.126
NIX.CZ - Neutral Internet eXchange for the Czech RepublicPrague, Czech Republic91.210.16.215

Transit providers

9 upstream, 2 downstream and 17 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS39392SH.cz s.r.o.172
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC94
AS21430WIA spol. s.r.o.88
AS24482SG.GS7
AS29504Freenet Liberec, z.s.7
AS1764Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH6
AS8218Zayo Infrastructure France SA6
AS20562Broadband Hosting B.V.6

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 6 prefixes · 19.97K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CZCzechia7

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS15614
Registry name
Dragon
Registrant
DRAGON-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@dragon.cz
Registered
2002-06-01
Last changed
2025-07-16
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 7 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
10 authorising AS15614
ASPA
3 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
Route objects
10 naming AS15614

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check