Autonomous system
AS13110 INEA-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
INEA
isp telecom business
Each block gets its own letter, which is how truncated reverse names stay unique.
What it's used for
- A Polish cable and internet provider. 171,520 addresses across 21 IPv4 prefixes, two IPv6 prefixes, and 139 observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Eighteen of 18 sampled addresses returned names, all of the form
c32-0.icpnet.pl: a single letter, then the last two octets. - The letter changes with the block:
canddon one range,eon another,fon a third. - Netnames are all
PL-INEASP, dated from20000321through20121227. - The domain answering matches neither the holder nor the netname.
Interesting
- Dropping the first two octets from a generated name makes it short, and it makes it ambiguous: several blocks would produce the same label. The letter is the fix. One character per block restores uniqueness at a fraction of the length, and it works because the operator controls how many blocks there are. Another provider in this range truncated its names the same way without adding the letter, and does have the collisions.
- A perfect answer rate across 18 addresses means the zone is generated for the whole allocation, not filled in by hand.
- Twenty-one prefixes, thirteen years of netname dates, and one naming scheme applied consistently across all of them. That combination is unusual: most holders in this range change convention every few blocks.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 4 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.195.92 |
| TPIX - Internet Exchange | Warsaw, Poland | 195.149.232.217 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Warsaw | Warsaw, Poland | 195.182.218.31 |
| Thinx IX | Warsaw, Poland | 212.91.1.23 |
Transit providers
18 upstream, 28 downstream and 51 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 21 prefixes · 172K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| PL | Poland | 23 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS13110- Registry name
- INEA-AS
- Registrant
- INEA-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@inea.com.pl
- Registered
- 2002-05-25
- Last changed
- 2026-09-24
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 87% valid · 20 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 20 authorising AS13110
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 23 of 23 announcements
- Route objects
- 26 naming AS13110
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere