Autonomous system
AS13094 SFO-IX-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
SFO-IX
infrastructure transit telecom
Hostnames built with underscores, which are not valid characters in a hostname.
What it's used for
- A Russian internet exchange point. 512 addresses in one IPv4 prefix, 70 observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- Two of three sampled addresses returned names:
host_91_221_180_128.milecom.ruandhost_91_221_181_126.milecom.ru. - The netname is
SFO-IX; the registrant is a company named in neither the handle nor the holder field. - Seventy observed BGP neighbours behind a single
/23. - First observed in the routing archive in October 2001.
Interesting
- Underscores separate the octets where every other generated name in this range uses hyphens. The hyphen convention is not a style choice: underscores are outside the character set hostnames are defined over, and strict resolvers and some client libraries reject them. These names work in practice because most software is lenient, which is exactly why the mistake survives.
- Seventy neighbours against 512 addresses is the clearest exchange-point signature there is. The space is the shared fabric that member networks peer across; the traffic never terminates here, so the address count says nothing about the volume.
- Four different organisation names appear across the handle, the holder, the registrant and the reverse zone. Exchange points are often run by one company on another's infrastructure, and every layer keeps its own.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| MSK-IX Moscow | Moscow, Russia | 195.208.209.36 |
| MSK-IX Novosibirsk | Novosibirsk, Russia | 193.232.87.58 |
Transit providers
9 upstream, 28 downstream and 45 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS13094- Registry name
- SFO-IX-AS
- Registrant
- LLCMILECOM-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@domru.ru
- Registered
- 2011-03-23
- Last changed
- 2026-05-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS13094
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS13094
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere