Autonomous system
AS12988 ASN-PHOENIX # AS-PHOENIX CONVERTED TO ASN-PHOENIX FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
The Phoenix Insurance
finance business enterprise
An AS handle that contains a note explaining why the AS handle was changed.
What it's used for
- The network of an Israeli insurance company. 1,024 addresses in one IPv4 prefix, three observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- The whole inventory is
192.118.36.0/22, netnamePHOENIX-NET. - The AS handle is
ASN-PHOENIX # AS-PHOENIX CONVERTED TO ASN-PHOENIX FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE. - First observed in the routing archive in August 2000.
- Three addresses were sampled and none returned a name.
Interesting
- That handle is a migration note that never got removed. When the registry moved to a formal routing policy language, object names beginning
AS-became reserved for a different kind of record, so every conflicting name was mechanically renamed and the reason was appended as a comment. Decades later the comment is still part of the identifier, displayed by every tool that shows this AS. - It is the most complete accidental documentation in this range: the old name, the new name, and the reason for the change, all preserved because nobody had a reason to tidy it. Registry data keeps its own history in the places where cleanup would have taken effort and produced nothing.
192.118is space allocated to Israeli organisations in the early 1990s, and a /22 has been enough for an insurance company ever since. The visible network of a large financial firm is consistently tiny across every country in this range.- Three neighbours and nothing answering to a name, which is the pattern this whole sector follows.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IL | Israel | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12988- Registry name
- ASN-PHOENIX
- Registrant
- NV-MNT-RIPE
- Abuse contact
- shlomob@phoenix.co.il
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS12988
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS12988
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere