asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10954 SERVICO FEDERAL DE PROCESSAMENTO DE DADOS - SERPRO

Unclassified LACNIC

IPv4 addresses 147K 57 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 30 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BR
Exchanges 4 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 8 7 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

SERPRO

Brazil · AI-generated

government legacy

AS10954 is Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados (SERPRO), the Brazilian federal government's data-processing corporation. RIS observes 34 IPv4 prefixes covering 147,456 addresses, 8 IPv6 prefixes, and 34 observed neighbours. The sampled reverse DNS resolves under serpro.gov.br, confirming the space is used by SERPRO itself rather than reassigned to unrelated parties.

What it's used for

SERPRO is the state-owned IT services company that builds and runs the systems behind much of Brazil's federal administration, most visibly the tax authority's filing and collection platforms. The routed space is the delivery network for those systems: datacentre capacity, public-facing government services, and the federal agencies that consume them. A PTR such as dibm1.bsa.serpro.gov.br points at Brasília, which is where the organisation is headquartered.

Notable

The prefix set spans three separate ranges (161.148.0.0/16, 189.9.0.0/16 and part of 200.198.0.0), each announced both as an aggregate and broken down into /18s, /19s and smaller. That layering is deliberate: it lets the operator steer individual blocks across different paths while keeping a single covering route as a safety net if a more-specific is withdrawn.

Interesting

Thirty-four neighbours and a full IPv6 deployment across eight prefixes make this one of the better-connected government networks in Latin America. IPv6 is unusually well established in Brazil generally, and a federal service provider carrying real v6 in the global table is a reflection of that.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 4 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
IX.br (PTT.br) São PauloSão Paulo, Brazil187.16.223.178
IX.br (PTT.br) BrasíliaBrasília, Brazil45.184.144.15
IX.br (PTT.br) CuritibaCuritiba, Brazil45.184.146.218
IX.br (PTT.br) SalvadorSalvador, Brazil200.219.145.56

Transit providers

8 upstream, 7 downstream and 20 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS14840BR.Digital Telecom822
AS13335Cloudflare, Inc.520
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC427
AS53062GGNET TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA164
AS4230CLARO S.A.118
AS28666HOSTLOCATION LTDA100
AS16735ALGAR TELECOM S/A64
AS10429TELEFONICA BRASIL S.A1

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 57 prefixes · 147K addresses IPv6 30 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BRBrazil87

Registry

Allocation record

LACNIC · via Atlas (registry data)
Registry
LACNIC
Registered
1999-11-17
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 40 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS10954
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 40 of 40 announcements
Route objects
10 naming AS10954

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,781 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check