Autonomous system
AS10594 CEC - Cutting Edge Communications, Inc.
Unclassified ARIN NSP
Summary
Cutting Edge Communications, Inc.
isp legacy
CEC is Cutting Edge Communications, an independent Internet provider in Spokane, Washington, selling home and business connectivity across the Spokane / Coeur d'Alene area from its own downtown facility. The generic handle gives nothing away; the reverse DNS does.
What it's used for
RIS observes 6 IPv4 prefixes carrying 17,408 addresses, no IPv6, and 17 observed BGP neighbours. The prefixes are broad and few — two /20s, a second /20, a /21, another /21, a /22 — which is how an access network is built: large contiguous pools that get sliced into subscriber assignments, not the pile of scattered /24s an enterprise accumulates.
The PTRs confirm it. Nearly everything sampled resolves under cet.com in the shape ip-69-41-136-5-spk.cet.com — a per-address template with a spk (Spokane) site tag, which is subscriber-pool naming. One sampled name, repowell-dsl-1-120-4.cet.com, is an access-line record; dns-resolver1.cet.com is the provider's own recursive resolver. Another block resolves under daviscomm.net, a second brand carried inside the same AS. Seventeen peers is consistent with a regional ISP that buys a couple of transits and picks up settlement-free peering at a nearby exchange.
Notable
Read the access technology in those names as a mechanism, not a customer type: dsl in a PTR says how the line is delivered, not who is on it. What identifies this as an eyeball network is the pool structure and the provider-templated naming across whole /20s — homes and small businesses at the end of every one.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Seattle Internet Exchange | Seattle, United States | 206.81.80.87 |
Transit providers
8 upstream, 3 downstream and 13 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 7 prefixes · 15.87K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 7 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS10594- Registry name
- CEC
- Registrant
- Cutting Edge Communications, Inc.
- Abuse contact
- sudti@cet.com
- Registered
- 1997-09-30
- Last changed
- 2013-05-03
- Allocation
- assigned
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Cutting Edge Communications
- Also known as
- CET
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- North America
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
RADB::AS-CEC-TRANSIT- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 2 facilities
- Website
- http://www.cet.com
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 6 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS10594
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 6 of 6 announcements
- Route objects
- 12 naming AS10594
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 455 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-11-14. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere