Autonomous system
AS10173 KSNET-AS KSNET.Inc
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
KSNET
business payments fintech south-korea
KSNET-AS belongs to KSNET, Inc., the South Korean payment processor founded in 1999. It runs a card VAN (value-added network) — the layer that carries card authorisations between merchants' terminals and every card issuer in Korea — plus a payment gateway for e-commerce, cash-receipt and point-card services.
What it's used for
- Payment transaction processing: the acquiring-side endpoints that merchant terminals, PG customers and issuer links connect to.
Notable
This is a business network in the enterprise sense: KSNET is a financial service company that operates a network to deliver its product, not a connectivity provider. The word NET in the name refers to a value-added network in the payments sense, and the routing table shows exactly that — it is not an ISP.
The pack records two announced IPv4 prefixes, 210.181.28.0/24 and 210.181.29.0/24 — adjacent halves of a /23, 512 addresses in total — no IPv6, and three observed BGP neighbours. Three upstreams against half a thousand addresses is a heavily multi-homed end site: the address footprint is tiny but the availability requirement is severe, because a card VAN that drops off the network stops checkout lines across the country. Splitting the /23 into two /24s lets KSNET steer each half independently across those three paths.
Nothing suggests a provider role. There is no customer address space, no peering estate, and no subscriber-shaped allocation — just a small, hard-to-kill block of transaction endpoints.
Interesting
- KSNET processed over a billion transactions a year by the end of the 2000s on an address footprint smaller than a single university department's.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-22, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10173- Registry name
- KSNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-09-01
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS10173
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS10173
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-23. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere