asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9972 INTINFRA-AS-KR-KR - INTMANAGEMENT Corp.,

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 3.33K 7 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

INTMANAGEMENT Corp.

South Korea · AI-generated

hosting legacy

AS9972 (INTINFRA-AS-KR) is held by INTMANAGEMENT Corp. (아이엔티매니지먼트, intcompany.co.kr), a Korean IT services company whose lines of business include systems integration, web development and an IDC arm selling web hosting, server hosting and colocation. The ASN is the routing side of that hosting business.

What it's used for

RIS sees 13 announced IPv4 prefixes totalling 3,328 addresses, no IPv6, and 2 observed BGP neighbours. Every announcement is a /24, and they come from ranges that do not sit near each other: 103.52.200-203, 45.113.48-51, plus singletons in 221.146, 61.34, 210.181, 106.249 and 210.180.

That inventory reads as a small hosting provider rather than a broker. The 45.113.48.0/22 and 103.52.200.0/22 groups are announced as component /24s — space allocated to the operator in one piece and then split for routing convenience, which is normal colocation practice — and the scattered singles are the sort of legacy assignments a Korean IT shop accumulates. Two upstreams and no peering fan-out mean this network buys transit and resells capacity to hosted customers; it is not selling transit onward.

Notable

  • The company sells IDC services (hosting and colocation) alongside SI and web work, so addresses in this space belong to customers of INTMANAGEMENT rather than to the company's own applications. Attribution to an end organisation should not stop at the ASN holder.
  • Scattered /24s across multiple ranges can look like a broker's inventory, but the two contiguous /22-sized runs and a real, matching hosting business argue against that reading here.
  • No IPv6 is announced.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation736
AS4766Korea Telecom59

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 7 prefixes · 3.33K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of7

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9972
Registry name
INTINFRA-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2000-04-14
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 13 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9972
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
62% registered · 8 of 13 announcements
Route objects
2 naming AS9972

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check