Autonomous system
AS9939 DYXNET-CN DYXNET of Shenzhen Communication Co., Ltd.
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
DYXnet (Shenzhen)
business enterprise hosting legacy
AS9939 (DYXNET-CN) is held by DYXnet — 第一线 — through its Shenzhen communications entity. DYXnet is a Greater China enterprise network operator selling MPLS/SD-WAN corporate connectivity, cloud interconnect and managed network security, and is a subsidiary of VNET Group.
What it's used for
This is a corporate data network, not an eyeball ISP, and the reverse DNS says it plainly. Almost every sampled address resolves to a static-ip-<host>-<octets>.rev.dyxnet.com PTR — a static-assignment naming scheme, the kind you give leased-line customers and hosted servers, with no DSL/cable/PPPoE pattern anywhere in the sample. A couple of addresses instead resolve under gza-core1.anlai.com, a Guangzhou core-router name inherited from the network's earlier Anlai identity, which still appears in some third-party records for this ASN.
RIS sees 24 IPv4 prefixes carrying 57,344 addresses, built from three blocks — 152.104.128.0/17, 203.148.0.0/18 and 218.97.160.0/19 — plus a set of more-specific /18s to /22s carved out of them. Announcing both the covering aggregate and its deaggregates is normal traffic-engineering for a network with multiple regional POPs. No IPv6 is announced. Only 2 observed neighbours, which tells you DYXnet reaches the wider internet through a small number of Chinese upstreams rather than peering in its own right — the customer relationships are what matter here, not the interconnection.
Notable
- The
152.104.0.0space is an unusual holding: a legacy Class-B-era range now used in Greater China, rather than the202/203/218APNIC ranges the rest of the network sits in. - Enterprise connectivity in mainland China needs licensed local entities, which is why the ASN is registered to a Shenzhen company rather than to DYXnet's Hong Kong-facing brand.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 28 prefixes · 57.34K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 28 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9939- Registry name
- DYXNET-CN
- Abuse contact
- mikel@dyxnet.com
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2021-11-16
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 24 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 25 authorising AS9939
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 24 of 24 announcements
- Route objects
- 449 naming AS9939
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere