Autonomous system
AS9871 KBE-AS-KR-KR - Gyeong Sang Buk-Do Office of Education
Education ARIN
Summary
Gyeongsangbuk-do Office of Education
education government legacy
AS9871 (KBE-AS-KR) is registered to the Gyeongsangbuk-do Office of Education, the provincial education authority for North Gyeongsang Province in South Korea, headquartered in Andong. It is the network of a school-district administrator, not a commercial ISP.
What it's used for
Korea's provincial Offices of Education are the government bodies that run the public school system in their province: they administer the schools, employ the teachers, and — relevant here — operate the data network that connects those schools and the education office's own systems. The routing evidence matches that role exactly. RIS sees 16 IPv4 prefixes carrying 9,472 addresses and no IPv6, and the AS is seen with only 3 BGP neighbours. A handful of neighbours means this network buys connectivity rather than selling it; the address count is far too small to be a carrier and far too large to be a single office. What it looks like is a consumer of transit distributing a modest, fragmented block of address space across a lot of school sites.
Notable
- The announced space is not one clean allocation but a scatter of small blocks from several ranges (
117.111.128.0/20down to a set of /23s and /24s in61.x,125.243.x,58.29.xand203.190.x), which is typical of an institution that has accreted address space over many years rather than being handed a single delegation. - Every Korean province and metropolitan city has its own Office of Education, and several of them hold their own low-numbered ASNs — this is one of that family, not a national education backbone.
- It carries no IPv6 in the global table.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-12, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 14 prefixes · 9.98K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 14 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9871- Registry name
- KBE-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-02-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 17 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9871
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 17 of 17 announcements
- Route objects
- 49 naming AS9871
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 453 networks and 1,848 prefixes, as published 2026-11-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere