Autonomous system
AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street
Residential DROP-listed space APNIC NSP
Summary
China Telecom (ChinaNet)
isp eyeball backbone
China Telecom's ChinaNet backbone (CHINANET-BACKBONE, also called the "163" network) — one of the largest networks on the internet by announced address space.
What it's used for
- Fixed broadband and backbone for hundreds of millions of subscribers across China; a massive "eyeball" network.
Notable
- State-owned; like all Chinese consumer networks, its international traffic passes through the national filtering system (the "Great Firewall").
- Announces one of the biggest IPv4 footprints of any single ASN.
Interesting
- China Telecom also runs CN2 (a higher-quality international backbone, often seen under other ASNs) used for premium cross-border routes.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 15 exchanges in 8 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.195.33 |
| LINX LON1 | London, United Kingdom | 195.66.225.54 |
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.212.76 |
| NAPAfrica IX Johannesburg | Johannesburg, South Africa | 196.60.8.20 |
| Coresite - Any2 West | Los Angeles, United States | 206.72.210.117 |
| Any2 California | Los Angeles, United States | 206.72.210.117 |
| DE-CIX New York | New York, United States | 206.82.104.247 |
| Johannesburg Internet Exchange | Johannesburg, South Africa | 196.60.96.28 |
Transit providers
31 upstream, 167 downstream and 363 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 9,249 prefixes · 98.89M addresses IPv6 6,806 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 16,055 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS4134- Registry name
- CHINANET-BACKBONE
- Abuse contact
- anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2021-06-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- China Telecom
- Also known as
- ChinaNet
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Global
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
RADB::AS-CN- Present at
- 9 exchanges
- Facilities
- 10 facilities
- Website
- http://en.chinatelecom.com.cn/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 94% valid · 2,687 valid, 105 with no ROA 75 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 2,885 authorising AS4134
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2,867 of 2,867 announcements
- Route objects
- 3,652 naming AS4134
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
7 DROP matches Announced space overlapping the DROP prefix list.
| Announced | DROP entry | Record |
|---|---|---|
| 49.88.0.0/14 | 49.89.240.0/22 | SBL641952 |
| 114.231.208.0/20 | 114.231.216.0/22 | SBL641058 |
| 114.236.0.0/14 | 114.239.188.0/24 | SBL641951 |
| 117.60.0.0/18 | 117.60.11.0/24 | SBL641284 |
| 121.14.0.0/17 | 121.14.35.0/24 | SBL655995 |
| 121.234.0.0/15 | 121.234.236.0/24 | SBL641953 |
| 223.144.0.0/12 | 223.155.16.0/24 | SBL656595 |
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
172 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.
| Prefix | Advisory | Published |
|---|---|---|
106.122.171.92 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
110.85.170.125 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
112.66.108.16 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
113.76.136.171 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
117.61.244.135 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
117.92.127.132 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
120.36.248.104 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
120.36.248.109 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
120.36.248.185 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
120.36.248.200 | Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data | 2026-10-08 |
Showing the first 10 of 172.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere