asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9769 SEJONG-AS-KR - Sejong University

Education RIPE

IPv4 addresses 28.16K 23 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Sejong University

South Korea · AI-generated

education university legacy

AS9769 (SEJONG-AS) is held by Sejong University, a private university in Gwangjin-gu, Seoul. This is the campus network: it carries the university's own students, staff, labs and public-facing services, and nothing else.

What it's used for

RIS shows 28,160 IPv4 addresses across 15 prefixes. The footprint is anchored on a 223.195.0.0/18 with a /20 beside it, plus a pair of /21s and several /22s and /23s in 210.107.x, and a small 203.250.148.0/23 group. Nearly 30,000 addresses is a large but entirely ordinary holding for a Korean university, which reflects when the space was assigned rather than any present-day need: campuses in this ASN range were allocated generously in the 1990s, long before NAT and RFC 1918 addressing became the norm for lab and dormitory subnets.

The decisive signal is that all of it hangs off one observed BGP neighbour. A single upstream on 28k addresses rules out any transit or wholesale role — thousands of neighbours would be the tell for that. In Korea the research-and-education backbone (KREONET/KOREN) is the usual single upstream for a campus AS, and a university's ASN typically exists so it can hold portable space and announce it consistently rather than to multi-home. No IPv6 is announced from this ASN.

Notable

  • Sejong is a private institution, not to be confused with Sejong City or the state bodies that carry the same name. The handle is not evidence of a government network.
  • The more-specific prefixes inside the /18 suggest internal routing policy or historical sub-allocations to departments, not separate organisations.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation899

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-04, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 23 prefixes · 28.16K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of23

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS9769
Registry name
SEJONG-AS-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-12-10
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 17 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9769
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
59% registered · 10 of 17 announcements
Route objects
25 naming AS9769

Reputation

Classification and threat

Education University, school or national research and education network.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 453 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-05. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check