asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9767 DONGBUIT-AS-KR-KR - DB Inc.

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 10.50K 20 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

DB Inc. (formerly Dongbu)

South Korea · AI-generated

enterprise hosting legacy

AS9767 (DONGBUIT-AS-KR) is held by DB Inc., the IT services company of South Korea's DB Group. It was Dongbu Inc. until an October 2017 rename, which is where the DONGBUIT handle comes from. The business is systems integration and IT outsourcing — application and infrastructure operations, disaster recovery and security services, an integrated data centre, and cloud — sold mainly into finance, the public sector, manufacturing, construction and logistics, alongside the group's own affiliates.

What it's used for

The routing evidence matches an IT outsourcer running a data centre rather than an ISP running an access network. RIS shows 10,496 IPv4 addresses across 41 prefixes, and the arithmetic is exact: every single announcement is a /24. They cluster heavily in 210.127.x with smaller groups in 210.101.x, 210.126.x, 210.108.x and 211.60.x. A wall of same-sized /24s, no aggregates above them, is what you get when address space is handed out one block per hosted customer or per managed environment — which is precisely what an SI/ITO provider does for the clients whose systems it operates.

Only two observed BGP neighbours back this up. A network with thousands of neighbours on 10k addresses would be a transit carrier; two upstreams and no peering fabric means this AS exists to keep a managed data centre reachable, not to move other people's traffic.

Notable

  • DB Inc. also runs non-IT lines (chemical and steel trading, HR services), so the corporate entity is broader than the network. The AS itself is purely the IT services and data-centre side.
  • No IPv6 is announced.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS9318SK Broadband Co Ltd1,256
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation1,184

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-06, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 20 prefixes · 10.50K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of20

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9767
Registry name
DONGBUIT-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-12-10
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 41 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9767
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 41 of 41 announcements
Route objects
52 naming AS9767

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,854 prefixes, as published 2026-11-06. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check