Autonomous system
AS9754 CSU-AS CHOSUN UNIVERSITY
Education APNIC
Summary
Chosun University
legacy education university
AS9754 (CSU-AS) belongs to Chosun University, a large private university in the Dong-gu district of Gwangju, South Korea, with a student body in the tens of thousands. The CSU handle is the university's own abbreviation and should not be confused with any similarly-abbreviated institution elsewhere.
What it's used for
This is a campus network with an unusually fragmented announcement pattern: 101 IPv4 prefixes covering 24,832 addresses, no IPv6, and 2 observed BGP neighbours. The prefixes come from just three ranges of KRNIC-allocated space — 203.237.96.0/19, 220.67.192.0/19, and 117.16.0.0/20 plus 117.16.16.0/20 — broken into a long tail of /24s (220.67.213.0/24, 203.237.114.0/24, 117.16.31.0/24 and dozens more). Announcing a /19 alongside nearly every /24 inside it is a campus splitting its address plan per department, building or lab and originating each block in its own right.
The neighbour count rules out any provider reading of those 101 prefixes. Two adjacencies means the university buys transit and sells nothing: no customer cone, no peering programme. The space is the institution's own, held from Korea's early academic allocations and used for faculties, residences, labs and public-facing services.
Notable
- The three parent ranges reflect allocations picked up at different times as the campus grew, not space acquired from third parties.
- Heavy per-/24 deaggregation on a campus is usually about internal routing policy and traffic engineering across uplinks rather than anything external.
- Korean universities of this vintage typically reach the internet through the national research network plus a commercial carrier, giving them large address holdings and very little peering breadth — precisely the shape seen here.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 24.83K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9754- Registry name
- CSU-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-12-10
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 103 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9754
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 99.0% registered · 102 of 103 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS9754
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere