Autonomous system
AS9753 DAU-AS-KR - Dong-A Universirty
Education APNIC
Summary
Dong-A University
legacy education university
AS9753 (DAU-AS-KR) belongs to Dong-A University, a private university in Busan, South Korea, spread across the Seunghak, Gudeok and Bumin campuses. The registry spells the name "Universirty" — a typo in the handle, not a different organisation.
What it's used for
This is a campus network. RIS shows 24 IPv4 prefixes covering 65,536 addresses and no IPv6 origin, announced to just 2 observed BGP neighbours. Every prefix is carved from a single legacy 168.115.0.0/16 — the university announces the full /16 aggregate and then a set of sixteen /20s, plus a handful of smaller /21s through /23s, all inside it. That deaggregation pattern is internal engineering made visible: a large campus splitting its address plan by building, faculty or campus site and originating each slice separately, most likely for traffic-engineering across its uplinks. Two neighbours is the giveaway that this is an end network. It has a genuinely large address holding but essentially no peering breadth: it consumes transit, typically from the Korean research and commercial networks, and provides none.
Notable
- A full /16 for a single university is an artefact of early class-B era allocation, not a measure of how many hosts are actually online. Korean universities were among the earliest institutional networks on the internet and hold address space out of all proportion to modern need.
- The whole announced footprint fits inside one /16, so there is no third-party or brokered space here; the inventory is entirely the institution's own.
- No IPv6 origin was observed, which is worth noting for a network of this size.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 13 prefixes · 65.54K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 13 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9753- Registry name
- DAU-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-12-10
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 24 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9753
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 24 of 24 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS9753
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,847 prefixes, as published 2026-11-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere