asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9751 ASTCA-AS-AP - AMERICAN SAMOA TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY

Residential APNIC

IPv4 addresses 5.63K 13 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly AS
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

American Samoa Telecommunications Authority (ASTCA)

American Samoa · AI-generated

legacy isp residential government

AS9751 (ASTCA-AS-AP) is the network of the American Samoa Telecommunications Authority, the territory's government-owned telecom operator, trading online as samoatelco.com. ASTCA provides landline, television and fibre internet service in American Samoa and is governed by a board appointed by the Governor.

What it's used for

This is an island eyeball network. It announces 19 IPv4 prefixes covering 5,632 addresses, one IPv6 /32 (2403:2140::/32), and shows 3 observed BGP neighbours — three upstreams for off-island reach and no customer cone beneath it, exactly what a territory's sole retail operator looks like.

The v4 space is a wide scatter of blocks: 206.80.28.0/22, 8.41.132.0/23, several /24s in 38.x, 65.x, 205.161.x and 208.x, plus an APNIC 103.117.168.0/22. That multi-registry spread is normal for a Pacific territory. American Samoa is a US territory served by ARIN space but sits in the APNIC region, so the operator has accumulated small allocations from both over the years rather than one clean aggregate.

The reverse DNS settles what the space carries. Nearly every sampled address answers as IP-DYNAMIC-<addr>.dynamic.samoatelco.com — dynamically assigned subscriber addresses. Residential access, not hosting and not transit.

Notable

  • Do not read the multi-RIR inventory as a broker signal. The registrant is a single named public authority, the space carries its own subscribers, and the fragmentation reflects a small operator collecting allocations across two registries over decades.
  • ASTCA runs without a government subsidy, funding itself from telecom revenue, so it behaves commercially while being state-owned.
  • Under 6,000 addresses for an entire territory's broadband base shows how small this network is by ISP standards.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC707
AS11404Wave Broadband307
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC154

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-02, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 13 prefixes · 5.63K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
ASAmerican Samoa14

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9751
Registry name
ASTCA-AS-AP
Registrant
American Samoa Telecommunications Authority
Abuse contact
abuse@astca.net
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2021-08-25
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 20 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9751
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
95% registered · 19 of 20 announcements
Route objects
47 naming AS9751

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 449 networks and 1,846 prefixes, as published 2026-11-03. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check