Autonomous system
AS9712 KPIN-AS-KR-KR - INet Technologies Co., Ltd.
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
INet Technologies Co., Ltd.
hosting legacy
AS9712 (KPIN-AS-KR) is registered to INet Technologies Co., Ltd., a hosting and data-centre company based in Seocho-gu, Seoul. The KPIN handle is older than the current holder and appears to descend from the Korean PSINet operation, whose hosting business was one of the roots of today's Korean IDC market.
What it's used for
The routing evidence reads as hosting rather than access. RIS sees 24 IPv4 prefixes carrying 37,120 addresses, no IPv6, and just 2 observed neighbours (Korea Telecom and KDDI Korea). Two upstreams rules out a transit role, and the address estate is far too large and too fragmented to be one company's corporate edge. What stands out is where the space comes from: alongside the expected APNIC blocks (119.42.160.0/20, 202.136.112.0/21, 202.167.208.0/21, 211.35.64.0/21, 221.133.48.0/21, 103.38.24.0/23, 43.242.112.0/23) the AS also announces ARIN-registry space, 38.226.64.0/19 and 104.251.56.0/21. Announcing blocks from two different RIRs is normal for a provider that has bought or leased extra address space to feed customer servers, but it is also the shape address brokers show, so treat the inventory as mixed-origin rather than assuming a single clean allocation history.
Notable
- Third-party datasets classify the network as a hosting/data-centre operator, and note that a portion of the space has been observed running open proxies. That is common in the address space of a provider that rents servers to arbitrary customers, and it is a reason to treat traffic from this AS as untrusted rather than as residential.
- No IPv6 is announced despite a substantial IPv4 estate.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-07, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 26 prefixes · 36.61K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 26 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9712- Registry name
- KPIN-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-10-05
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 8% valid · 2 valid, 22 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS9712
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 24 of 24 announcements
- Route objects
- 38 naming AS9712
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-11-08. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere