Autonomous system
AS10160 KDDIKOREA-AS-KR KDDI KOREA
Hosting APNIC
Summary
KDDI Korea
business enterprise datacenter south-korea
KDDIKOREA-AS-KR is the network of KDDI Korea, the Seoul subsidiary the Japanese carrier KDDI set up in 1999 to sell telephony, corporate internet access and data centre services inside South Korea.
What it's used for
- Enterprise connectivity and colocation for corporate customers in Korea, many of them Japanese multinationals that want the same supplier on both sides of the strait. KDDI Korea has run an Internet Data Center since 2000, moved to Seoul's Mapo district in 2016.
Notable
This is a business network — a corporate-facing service provider — rather than an eyeball ISP or a wholesale carrier, and the neighbour count is what rules those out. The pack records two observed BGP neighbours against 65 announced IPv4 prefixes and 24,576 addresses. A network that peers with only two other ASes is buying transit at both ends and selling connectivity onward to customers, not to networks: real carriers of this address size sit on hundreds of adjacencies.
The prefix list is the other half of the story. One aggregate (119.59.32.0/19) plus roughly sixty individual /24s in 61.106, 211.111 and 61.251 is exactly how a provider carves space when each customer or each rack tenant gets its own /24. Those blocks are self-registered to the holder, so this is a real operator whose space happens to be finely sliced, not an address-broker pattern.
Interesting
- KDDI's global data-centre estate trades under the Telehouse brand; the Korean IDC is the local expression of the same standard.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINX | Seoul, South Korea | 139.150.100.21 |
Transit providers
1 upstream, 1 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS45996 | DAOU TECHNOLOGY | 4,030 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 24.58K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10160- Registry name
- KDDIKOREA-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-09-01
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 65 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 40 authorising AS10160
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 65 of 65 announcements
- Route objects
- 51 naming AS10160
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere