Autonomous system
AS10160 KDDIKOREA-AS-KR KDDI KOREA
Hosting APNIC
Summary
KDDI Korea
business enterprise datacenter south-korea
KDDIKOREA-AS-KR is the network of KDDI Korea, the Seoul subsidiary the Japanese
carrier KDDI set up in 1999 to sell telephony, corporate internet access and data
centre services inside South Korea.
What it's used for
- Enterprise connectivity and colocation for corporate customers in Korea, many of them Japanese multinationals that want the same supplier on both sides of the strait. KDDI Korea has run an Internet Data Center since 2000, moved to Seoul's Mapo district in 2016.
Notable
This is a business network — a corporate-facing service provider — rather
than an eyeball ISP or a wholesale carrier, and the neighbour count is what rules
those out. The pack records two observed BGP neighbours against 65 announced
IPv4 prefixes and 24,576 addresses. A network that peers with only two other
ASes is buying transit at both ends and selling connectivity onward to
customers, not to networks: real carriers of this address size sit on
hundreds of adjacencies.
The prefix list is the other half of the story. One aggregate (119.59.32.0/19)
plus roughly sixty individual /24s in 61.106, 211.111 and 61.251 is exactly
how a provider carves space when each customer or each rack tenant gets its own
/24. Those blocks are self-registered to the holder, so this is a real operator
whose space happens to be finely sliced, not an address-broker pattern.
Interesting
- KDDI's global data-centre estate trades under the Telehouse brand; the Korean IDC is the local expression of the same standard.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10160- Registry name
- KDDIKOREA-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere