asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9709 KISVAN-AS-KR KIS Information Communication,Inc

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

KIS Information & Communication (KIS정보통신)

South Korea · AI-generated

enterprise legacy

AS9709 (KISVAN-AS-KR) is held by KIS Information & Communication, Inc., a South Korean payments company. KIS is one of the country's card VAN operators: the intermediary layer that carries authorisation and settlement traffic between merchant terminals and the card issuers. The handle matches its domain, kisvan.co.kr.

What it's used for

This is a single-purpose corporate network. RIS sees exactly 1 IPv4 prefix, 210.116.197.0/24, 256 addresses in total, no IPv6, and 3 observed neighbours. The ratio is the interesting part: three upstreams for one /24 is a deliberately over-provisioned edge, which is what a payment intermediary buys. The address count is irrelevant to a VAN, because the traffic that matters is transaction authorisation flowing over private links to card companies and out to merchant terminals, but availability is everything, since an outage means merchants cannot take card payments. So the network is tiny and multihomed rather than large and single-homed, the opposite of an access network's profile.

Notable

  • KIS operates in a crowded segment. South Korea has more than two dozen licensed VAN companies, with KIS alongside names such as KICC, KCP, NICE and Smartro.
  • Beyond classic terminal VAN service, the company offers payment-gateway services for online merchants, a smartphone-based payment app, and operates local-currency voucher schemes for Korean municipalities.
  • The company name is easy to confuse with KICC (한국정보통신), a different Korean VAN operator with a similar English rendering. They are separate businesses.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation28
AS9848SEJONG NETWORKS18
AS9318SK Broadband Co Ltd14

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS9709
Registry name
KISVAN-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-10-05
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9709
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
8 naming AS9709

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check