asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9696 EDAS-AS Oscar Enterprise

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 8.70K 25 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Oscar Enterprise

South Korea · AI-generated

enterprise business legacy

AS9696 (EDAS-AS) is registered to Oscar Enterprise, a South Korean organisation with a registry address in Seocho-gu, Seoul. Beyond the KRNIC record there is little public information about what the company does, so this card sticks to what the routing shows.

What it's used for

The AS announces 34 IPv4 prefixes, 8,704 addresses, no IPv6, with 2 observed BGP neighbours. Every prefix is a /24, and they are not one allocation: they are scattered across several Korean incumbent ranges, including 203.236.64.0-range and 14.32.0.0-range space inside Korea Telecom's KORNET blocks, plus /24s out of 175.196, 175.209, 211.104, 211.106, 121.135 and 183.98. The registry's routing policy names the two adjacencies: Korea Telecom (AS4766) and LG DACOM (AS3786).

Those two numbers together settle the role. Thirty-four scattered /24s with zero peering breadth is a customer network holding provider-assigned space from its own transit providers and multihoming across the pair of them — most plausibly across several sites or hosted tenants. A network that resold connectivity would show adjacencies below it; there are none. Under 9,000 addresses also rules out an eyeball ISP of any consequence.

Notable

  • The same registrant name appears against AS9490, so this is one of at least two autonomous systems under the same holder.
  • Nothing in the evidence establishes the business behind the name. Third-party IP databases label it variously an ISP, an eyeball network and a hosting provider, which are geolocation heuristics rather than registry facts — the BGP shape supports none of them strongly.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4766Korea Telecom1,782
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation289

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 25 prefixes · 8.70K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of25

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS9696
Registry name
EDAS-AS-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-10-05
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 36 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9696
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
64% registered · 23 of 36 announcements
Route objects
26 naming AS9696

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check