asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9694 SEOKYUNG-CATV-AS-KR Seokyung Cable Television Co.. Ltd.

Residential APNIC

IPv4 addresses 198K 7 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Seokyung Cable Television (SCS)

South Korea · AI-generated

isp residential legacy

AS9694 (SEOKYUNG-CATV-AS-KR) is held by Seokyung Cable Television Co., Ltd. (서경방송, branded SCS), a regional cable system operator in South Gyeongsang Province, South Korea. It is a classic hybrid fibre-coax operator that sells television and broadband to households in its franchise area.

What it's used for

The routing evidence is textbook eyeball access. RIS sees 103 IPv4 prefixes carrying 197,632 addresses, with no IPv6 announced, and only 3 observed neighbours. The combination matters: nearly 200,000 addresses is far more than any enterprise consumes, but three upstreams is far too few for a carrier that resells transit. That shape means the addresses terminate on the operator's own subscribers. The prefix list backs it up. A 182.31.0.0/16 and several /17s and /18s form the core pools, and the remaining hundred-odd announcements are /21s and smaller carved out of those same blocks, which is what a cable operator's per-region CMTS and access aggregation looks like when it deaggregates its own space.

Notable

  • SCS holds a comprehensive cable broadcasting licence for the Jinju, Sacheon, Namhae, Sancheong, Hamyang and Hadong areas, and has offered commercial internet alongside television since the late 1990s.
  • Product line is the usual Korean SO triple play: cable TV, optical LAN and coax broadband, and a VoIP telephony service.
  • The complete absence of IPv6 is notable for a Korean residential network of this size, and is consistent with the country's smaller regional SOs generally lagging the national carriers on v6 deployment.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINXSeoul, South Korea139.150.100.27

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4766Korea Telecom2,901
AS9318SK Broadband Co Ltd1,720
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation1,713

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 7 prefixes · 198K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of7

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9694
Registry name
SEOKYUNG-CATV-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-10-05
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 103 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9694
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 103 of 103 announcements
Route objects
97 naming AS9694

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check