asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9678 HOSTINGINSIDE HostingInside LTD.

Hosting APNIC

IPv4 addresses 5.12K 11 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 3 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly TW
Exchanges 2 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 10 10 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

HostingInside

Taiwan · AI-generated

hosting legacy

AS9678 (HOSTINGINSIDE-INTL) is held by HostingInside LTD, a Taichung-based Taiwanese hosting company selling VPS, dedicated servers and colocation. The provider advertises presence in several cities beyond Taiwan, and its routing inventory matches that claim rather than a single-country footprint.

What it's used for

This is a small multi-region hosting network. RIS sees 20 IPv4 prefixes carrying 5,120 addresses and 4 IPv6 prefixes, with 24 observed BGP neighbours. The neighbour count is the interesting number: two dozen peers against only twenty /24s means this network peers far more widely than its size would suggest, which is what a hosting provider that shows up at internet exchanges in several metros looks like. It is not buying transit at one door and reselling it.

The IPv4 inventory is entirely /24s, and they are drawn from more than one RIR at once: APNIC space (103.37.4.0/24, 103.98.73.0/24, 223.26.0.0/24, 203.66.151.0/24), RIPE space (2.58.240.0/24–2.58.243.0/24) and ARIN space (74.214.160.0/24, 74.214.161.0/24). Scattered single /24s across multiple registries is also the shape an address broker leaves, so it is worth being explicit about what separates this case: the reverse DNS across both the APNIC and the RIPE blocks resolves to HostingInside's own naming (151-66-203-5.hostinginside.com, 242-58-2-5.hostinginside.com), so the provider is operating the space itself, not warehousing it. One sampled address carries a customer-set name outside that pattern, as expected on server hosting.

Notable

  • Expect server, VPS and colocation traffic from this AS, not consumer access.
  • The company runs more than one ASN; this legacy number is not the whole of its network.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Taipei Internet Exchange (TPIX)Taipei, Taiwan203.163.222.100
Student & Technology United Internet ExchangesTaipei, Taiwan103.158.187.123

Transit providers

10 upstream, 10 downstream and 26 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3491PCCW Global (HK) Ltd.549
AS2914NTT America, Inc.378
AS35916MULTACOM CORPORATION117
AS58453China Mobile International Limited89
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC28
AS199524G-Core Labs S.A.27
AS20860IOMART CLOUD SERVICES LIMITED26
AS24482SG.GS17

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 11 prefixes · 5.12K addresses IPv6 3 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
TWTaiwan, Province of China14

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9678
Registry name
HOSTINGINSIDE-INTL
Abuse contact
nokoya@hostinginside.com
Registered
2020-06-19
Last changed
2026-05-08
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
92% valid · 22 valid, 0 with no ROA 2 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
37 authorising AS9678
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 24 of 24 announcements
Route objects
102 naming AS9678

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

1 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.

PrefixAdvisoryPublished
2.58.242.74Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data2026-10-08

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check