Autonomous system
AS9631 YSU-AS-KR-KR - youngsan university
Education RIPE
Summary
Youngsan University
education university legacy
AS9631 (YSU-AS-KR) is registered to Youngsan University (영산대학교), a private university in South Korea with campuses in Yangsan, South Gyeongsang Province, and the Haeundae district of Busan. It is a campus network: the AS exists to carry students, staff, labs and university services, not to sell connectivity.
What it's used for
The routing evidence is exactly what a self-hosted campus looks like. RIS shows 33 IPv4 prefixes covering 8,448 addresses, no IPv6, and 2 observed neighbours. Two adjacencies means the university is dual-homed to a pair of upstreams — enough for redundancy, and nothing more. There is no peering fabric and no downstream cone, which is the difference between an institution that runs its own AS for resilience and a network that sells transit. At roughly 8,000 addresses, the estate is sized for a campus population rather than a service provider's pool.
The prefixes themselves are all /24s, scattered across many unrelated blocks (61.75.198–201, 221.164.x, 211.220.22x–23x, 210.110.4x, 220.119.24x, 121.67.137, 220.77.177), with no aggregation anywhere. That is the fingerprint of an institution that accumulated small assignments from Korean carriers over a long period, one building, lab or campus expansion at a time, rather than receiving a single contiguous allocation. Announcing them separately keeps each assignment independently routable across the two upstreams.
Notable
- All 33 prefixes are
/24s. Nothing has ever been aggregated into anything larger. - No IPv6 is announced, which is common for Korean campus networks of this vintage even though the national research network has long supported it.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-02, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 12 prefixes · 8.45K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 12 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS9631- Registry name
- YSU-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-08-18
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 37 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9631
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 97% registered · 36 of 37 announcements
- Route objects
- 28 naming AS9631
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 449 networks and 1,846 prefixes, as published 2026-11-03. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere