Autonomous system
AS9578 CJNET-AS Cheiljedang.Co.Inc.
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
CJ CheilJedang (CJNET)
enterprise legacy
AS9578 (CJNET-AS-KR) is registered to Cheiljedang Co., Inc., now CJ CheilJedang, the Seoul food, food-ingredients and biotechnology company at the centre of the CJ Group. CJ began as a sugar and flour manufacturer, was originally part of Samsung Group and separated from it in the 1990s; the group today spans food, bio, logistics, retail and entertainment. The CJNET handle is the group's corporate network.
What it's used for
This is enterprise infrastructure, not a service provider, and the routing figures make that unambiguous. RIS shows 72 IPv4 prefixes covering 20,992 addresses, no IPv6, and 3 observed neighbours. Three neighbours means a couple of Korean upstreams and nothing downstream: no peering fabric, no customer cone, no wholesale role. This AS exists to connect CJ to the internet, not to carry anyone else.
The estate is the other half of the story. Almost every prefix is an individual /24 scattered across unrelated Korean ranges (210.122.96.0–210.122.107.0, 116.121.x, 203.248.168.0–203.248.171.0, 14.34.8.0, 218.238.94.0, 61.101.38.0, 115.92.14.0). No residential-scale pools, no aggregation. That fragmentation is the signature of a conglomerate: each /24 is a site, an affiliate or an application estate, allocated separately over the years and announced separately because internal routing and firewall policy is organised the same way.
Notable
- The
154.10.xblocks are the only aggregated space in the inventory and sit outside the usual Korean registry ranges — the exception in an otherwise uniformly/24estate. - CJ CheilJedang's consumer brands include Bibigo, Beksul and Hetbahn. Sibling affiliates such as CJ Logistics, CJ ENM and CJ Olive Young are separate businesses.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 22 prefixes · 20.99K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 22 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9578- Registry name
- CJNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-07-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 73 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9578
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 81% registered · 59 of 73 announcements 6 other origin
- Route objects
- 100 naming AS9578
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere