asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9530 SHINSEGAE-AS SHINSEGAE I C Co., Ltd.

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 20.99K 33 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Shinsegae I&C

South Korea · AI-generated

enterprise hosting legacy

AS9530 (SHINSEGAE-AS-KR) is held by SHINSEGAE I&C Co., Ltd., the IT services arm of South Korea's Shinsegae Group, the retail conglomerate behind the Shinsegae department stores and E-Mart. The company sells IT system integration and operation, cloud, and retail technology (POS, payments, in-store systems), and this AS is the network underneath that business.

What it's used for

The routing shape is that of a corporate and data-centre network, not a carrier. RIS sees 79 IPv4 prefixes carrying 20,992 addresses, and no IPv6 at all. The prefixes are almost entirely /24s scattered across many different Korean blocks (202.3.x, 202.8.x, 210.207.x, 121.170.x, 123.140.x, 182.173.x, 222.112.x) with a single /22 as the largest. That kind of fragmented, accreted address footprint is typical of an enterprise that has picked up allocations piecemeal over years rather than a network that was ever planned as a routing backbone.

Only 3 BGP neighbours are observed. A wholesale or transit network of this vintage would peer with hundreds of ASes; three upstreams says this AS exists to connect Shinsegae's own estate and its hosted customers to the Korean internet, buying transit rather than selling it.

Notable

  • The address count is modest for a group of Shinsegae's size, which fits an enterprise/IDC role rather than an access network with subscribers.
  • No IPv6 is announced from this AS.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4766Korea Telecom2,923
AS9318SK Broadband Co Ltd1,034
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation942

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 33 prefixes · 20.99K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of33

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS9530
Registry name
SHINSEGAE-AS-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-05-13
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 81 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9530
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 81 of 81 announcements
Route objects
87 naming AS9530

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check