Autonomous system
AS9527 VP01-AS-KR-KR - VP
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
VP (VP01-AS-KR)
enterprise legacy
AS9527 (VP01-AS-KR) is registered in KRNIC to a holder recorded simply as VP — a two-letter name with no expansion in the registry. The most plausible match in Korea is VP Inc. (브이피(주)), a Seoul payment-authentication and mobile-security company, but the registry record does not confirm that link and this card does not assert it.
What it's used for
Whatever the holder's identity, the routing shape is that of a small enterprise. RIS sees 3 IPv4 prefixes, each a /24 (768 addresses in total), no IPv6, and 2 observed neighbours. Two of the prefixes are within 203.239.0.0 (203.239.100.0/24 and 203.239.109.0/24) and one is separate (211.119.189.0/24); the upstreams are Korean domestic carriers. Two neighbours means a modest dual-homed edge — enough redundancy to survive one provider failing, no peering estate, no customers behind it.
One detail deserves care rather than a conclusion. The netnames attached to the individual prefixes in public sources do not match the AS holder's name; they carry unrelated Korean labels. That is common in KRNIC, where descriptive netnames on old assignments were never updated as space changed hands, and it is not on its own evidence of anything untoward — but it does mean the address inventory and the AS registration tell slightly different stories, and neither should be read as proof of the other.
Notable
- A two-character holder name in the registry is unusually opaque; identification here rests on inference, not on a confirmed record.
- 768 addresses across three /24s with two upstreams: an end-site network, not a provider.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-04, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9527- Registry name
- VP01-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-05-13
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9527
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 27 naming AS9527
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 453 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-05. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere