asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9430 STPI-NOIDA Software Technology Parks of India,Block-IV

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 8.96K 29 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 4 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly IN
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 5 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Software Technology Parks of India (STPI)

India · AI-generated

government isp legacy

AS9430 (STPI-NOIDA) is held by Software Technology Parks of India, an autonomous body under India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. STPI is unusual in being a government organisation that also holds an all-India ISP licence: it has provided data-communications, internet and leased-line services to IT and software-export units since the early 1990s. The handle points at its Noida (Block-IV) facility.

What it's used for

The AS originates 34 IPv4 prefixes totalling 8,704 addresses, plus 4 IPv6 prefixes (2402:ef09::/32, 2402:ef0f::/32, 2402:ef15::/32 and a /48). Every single IPv4 announcement is a /24, and they are scattered across a wide set of unrelated ranges — 164.164.x, 203.100.x, 203.129.x, 203.190.x, 203.193.x, 161.248.26.0/24, 103.35.120.0/24. That pattern fits STPI's role precisely: it hands small blocks to the IT companies sitting in its parks and gateways around the country, and announces each one individually. The sampled reverse DNS is consistent with that — the two PTRs seen resolve under pugmarks.in, a third-party Indian provider, which is what customer-assigned space looks like rather than the operator's own infrastructure. Only 7 BGP neighbours are observed, so this is a modest gateway network buying transit, not a national carrier.

Notable

  • Every IPv4 route is a /24; there is no aggregate anywhere in the announcement set.
  • The rDNS that does exist points at a third party's naming, reinforcing that the space is delegated out to hosted units rather than used by STPI itself.
  • STPI is a government body with a commercial ISP licence, so it sits on the government/ISP boundary rather than cleanly on either side.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

5 upstream, 2 downstream and 10 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4755TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP707
AS9498BHARTI Airtel Ltd.632
AS55836Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited599
AS9730Bharti Telesonic Ltd221
AS9829National Internet Backbone11

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 29 prefixes · 8.96K addresses IPv6 4 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
INIndia33

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9430
Registry name
STPI-NOIDA
Abuse contact
blr.tech@stpi.in
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2013-01-03
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
23% valid · 9 valid, 29 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
20 authorising AS9430
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
95% registered · 37 of 39 announcements 2 other origin
Route objects
116 naming AS9430

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check