asn.dev

Routing security

AS9389 CGWNET BEIJING SHENZHOU GREATWALL COMMUNICATION

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 86% 31 of 36 announcements
RPKI invalid 1 dropped by validating networks
No ROA 4 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 36 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 31 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

36 observed

Every prefix observed with AS9389 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
211.166.253.0/24RPKI invalid · lengthNo IRR5
103.155.76.0/24No ROANo IRR52
103.155.77.0/24No ROANo IRR52
210.79.224.0/20No ROANo IRR52
210.79.240.0/20No ROANo IRR52
103.235.144.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
113.48.48.0/20RPKI validNo IRR41
113.48.224.0/20RPKI validNo IRR41
113.49.16.0/20RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.0.0/20RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.32.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.48.0/20RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.64.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.65.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.66.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.67.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.68.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
113.50.72.0/21RPKI validNo IRR52
118.64.0.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
118.64.4.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
118.64.248.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
118.64.252.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
118.65.0.0/21RPKI validNo IRR52
118.66.184.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
118.66.224.0/20RPKI validNo IRR41
121.39.255.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
211.165.0.0/16RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.0.0/16RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.4.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.8.0/21RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.17.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.246.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.247.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.249.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
211.166.250.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
2001:4510:400::/40RPKI validNo IRR19

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

31 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS9389 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS9389 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS9389 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CTBJRADBLists AS9389 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.