Autonomous system
AS9317 ITISNET-AS INHA UNIVERSITY
Education RIPE
Summary
Inha University
education university research legacy
AS9317 (ITISNET-AS) is held by Inha University, a private research university in Incheon, South Korea. It is the university's campus network, and the routing evidence is textbook for one.
What it's used for
RIS sees 51 IPv4 prefixes carrying 65,536 addresses — a full /16 — with no IPv6 and only 3 observed BGP neighbours. That combination is diagnostic. A network with tens of thousands of addresses and three peers is not selling anything to anyone: it takes connectivity from a small number of Korean upstreams and originates only its own space. Campus networks look exactly like this, because the entire address block serves one organisation's staff, students, labs and services.
Every announced prefix falls inside 165.246.0.0/16. The prefix count is high only because the university deaggregates its own /16 into a long list of /22s, /23s and /24s alongside the covering route — a common practice on campus networks where different faculties, dormitories and machine rooms are announced separately for traffic engineering or multi-path reasons, rather than a sign of a fragmented or traded allocation. Public records show the university's own service infrastructure (nameservers and management hosts under inha.ac.kr) living inside the same /16.
Notable
- A single contiguous
/16for one campus is a legacy-era allocation; universities that joined the internet later got far less. - Registry contacts point at the university's own network management office in Michuhol-gu, Incheon.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 34 prefixes · 65.54K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 34 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS9317- Registry name
- ITISNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1998-06-03
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 51 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9317
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 51 of 51 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS9317
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere